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When That Hotline Bling: 
The Tracking Device in Your Pocket 
 
 
Part I. Introduction 
 Thirty years ago the United States Supreme Court dismissed the notion that law 
enforcement could conduct continuous surveillance on individuals without a warrant. Justice 
Rehnquist stated that if “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country” became a 
possibility, “there will be time enough . . . to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”1 Today, the government now has the capability of conducting 
such around-the-clock surveillance on unwitting individuals without obtaining a warrant to do 
so. This technology is called cell-site location information (CSLI) and cell phone users generate 
it without their knowledge.2 It is time for the Supreme Court to recognize the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this information and protect cell phone users across the United States. 
 Most people are aware that their cell phone has to connect to a cell tower in order for a 
call to be made; cell-site location information is the information that is retained by the service 
provider that identifies which tower connected the last call.3 Using this information, law 
enforcement is able to plot a route that the individual has taken over a period of time.4 While this 
technology might not be able to precisely track a user’s movements in a sparsely covered area 
                                                        
1 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
2 See Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/400775/ (“In its 
most recent annual report, AT&T said it received 64,703 requests for CSLI in 2014. And just in the first six months 
of this year, Verizon says it received more than 21,000 requests. That is, in 2015, a single carrier received more than 
100 requests daily…”). 
3 See United States v. Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *15-16 (4th Cir. 2015). 
4 See Id. at *16-17. 
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due to the distance between cell towers, in urban areas the cell sites “tend to have smaller radii of 
operability” allowing them to more accurately place an individual.5 Service providers today are 
competing to provide an increasing coverage quality, leading to the placement of towers that 
cover areas as small as 40 feet resulting in increased precision at these sites.6 
 The Stored Communications Act, passed by Congress in 1986, has given law 
enforcement the capability to obtain electronic information generated by users of various 
technologies.7 Law enforcement must “offer[] specific and articulable facts” to receive a court 
order compelling the disclosure of the CSLI by the service provider.8 The Senate has described 
this standard as “higher than a subpoena, but not a probable-cause warrant.”9 In order to obtain 
CSLI, law enforcement must make a request upon a magistrate judge who has the ability to deny 
the request if the standard is not met.10 Unfortunately though, law enforcement has been able to 
meet this standard typically with ease allowing them to access this sensitive information. 
Law enforcement officials have made so many requests of AT&T, the service provider 
has been forced to establish a separate department solely tasked with responding to orders to 
compel disclosure of CSLI.11 The periods that they seek to obtain CSLI for are not confined to a 
small window in time; rather, the government has obtained cell-site location information for 
periods of as long as 221 days without a warrant obtained by a showing of probable cause.12 If 
the government obtained this quantity of location information about you, what might it uncover? 
                                                        
5 Id. at *17. 
6 See Id. at *36. 
7 Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS § 2701. 
8 18 USCS § 2703(d). 
9 See In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Comm. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). 
10 See Id. at 306. 
11 See Lauren E. Babst, Note, No More Shortcuts: Protect Cell Site Location Information With a Warrant 
Requirement, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 363, 375 (2015). 
12 See United States v. Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *10 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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Do people “reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner 
that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, 
sexual habits, and so on.”13 CSLI has the ability to track your movements to and from a place of 
worship, medical appointments, and other sensitive location information that the public would 
not to expect the government to obtain without a warrant. The unfortunate reality is that the 
government is obtaining this information nearly every day without a warrant. 
 Before discussing the case law surrounding the privacy rights implicated in CSLI, it is 
important to note the prevalence of cell phone use in modern American society. As of January 
2014, 99% of American adults own a cell phone and as of October 2014, 64% of American 
adults own a smart phone.14 Cell phones are no longer considered a luxury either; 84% of people 
making less than $30,000 a year own a cell phone and 90% of people making between $30,000 
and $49,999 own a cell phone.15 Furthermore, one in five cell phone owners has turned off the 
location feature on their cell phone.16 Yet turning off the location feature does not prevent CSLI 
from being generated. 
 Some courts and commentators suggest that by using a cell phone, society has voluntarily 
given up whatever constitutional right to privacy that may have existed through cell-site location 
information.17 It is time for the Supreme Court to weigh in on this pressing issue affecting the 
privacy interests of all cell phone users in the United States and recognize a reasonable 
                                                        
13 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
14 Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PewInternet.org, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-
sheet/ (last visited October 3, 2015). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); Scott A. 
Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New Proposal for Cell-Site Location 
Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571 (2012); Christopher Fox, Comment, Checking In: Historical Cell Site 
Location Information and the Stored Communications Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 769 (2012); Kyle Malone, 
Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of 
Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701 (2012). 
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expectation of privacy in CSLI. This paper will survey the applicable Supreme Court precedent 
in part II, the Circuit Courts that currently do not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in CSLI in part III, and the Circuit Court that does recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in CSLI in part IV. In part V, this paper will argue that the third party doctrine is not applicable 
to the records stored by cell phone service providers, cell phone users have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in their cell-site location information, and that expectation is a reasonable 
one in society’s eyes. This paper will also make the argument that CSLI is precise enough to 
implicate concerns expressed in the Supreme Court’s most recent case law on the subject. 
 
Part II. Fourth Amendment Constitutional Background 
A. Foundation 
 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.18 Before the government is allowed to perform a search of these 
things they must obtain a warrant by a showing of probable cause.19 The United States Supreme 
Court in Katz v. United States laid down the test for when a warrant is required before a search 
can be conducted. Katz was convicted of transferring wagering information via telephone in 
violation of a federal statute.20 The government obtained incriminating evidence by placing a 
recording device outside of the telephone booth at which Katz was making his phone calls.21 The 
government argued that this method was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because a telephone booth was not a constitutionally protected area. The Supreme 
                                                        
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
19 Id. 
20 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
21 See Id. 
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Court disagreed stating “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”22 Thus, it was a 
search for which a warrant was required because the government “violated the privacy upon 
which [Katz] justifiably relied . . .”23 Katz has been transformed into a two prong test as to 
whether a warrant is required: first, whether there is a subjective expectation of privacy and 
second, whether that expectation is objectively reasonable.24 
 
B. Third Party Doctrine 
 While Katz established the test for determining whether a warrant is required, the Court 
has also acknowledged that what a person exposes to the public does not receive Fourth 
Amendment protection.25 United States v. Miller helped develop a doctrine known as the third 
party doctrine, which governs this exception to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Miller 
was convicted of making alcohol and distributing it illegally.26 At trial, the government 
introduced evidence of checks that Miller had deposited at a bank, but the Court of Appeals ruled 
that Miller had a Fourth Amendment protection in his bank records if obtained by an illegal 
subpoena.27 When the question reached the Supreme Court it reasoned that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party . . .“28 The 
Court noted that the information had been “voluntarily conveyed” in the “ordinary course of 
business,” and as such Fourth Amendment protection was not warranted.29  
                                                        
22 Id. at 351. 
23 Id. at 353. 
24 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
25 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
26 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
27 See Id. at 436-37. 
28 Id. at 443. 
29 Id. at 442. 
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This doctrine was subsequently applied to telephone records in Smith v. Maryland. A 
robbery victim was receiving menacing calls from someone claiming to be the robber.30 In 
response, law enforcement installed a pen register at the telephone company which recorded the 
numbers dialed from a suspect’s home.31 The defendant was convicted in part because of the 
evidence obtained through this method of investigation.32 The Court, using the language of the 
third party doctrine, explained that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy when 
he dialed the telephone numbers.33 The Court took into consideration telephone users’ 
knowledge of how telephones worked in determining that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.34 
 
C. Modern Applications 
 Katz has remained the test that is applied to different surveillance technologies as the 
government has become more creative with their investigative techniques. In United States v. 
Knotts, law enforcement placed a beeper inside a chloroform container that was then used to 
track the transportation of the chloroform to defendant’s residence.35 While the defendant argued 
that this constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court rejected the argument 
stating “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”36 In other words, drivers 
                                                        
30 See Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
31 See Id. 
32 See Id. 
33 See Id. at 744. 
34 See Id. at 742 (“All telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, 
since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, 
moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see 
a list of their long-distance…calls on their monthly bills.”). 
35 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983). 
36 Id. at 281. 
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“voluntarily convey[] to anyone who want[] to look the fact that [they are] traveling over 
particular roads in a particular direction.”37 The Court then further reasoned that the information 
in this case could have been obtained by the police through mere visual surveillance, and as such 
the use of a beeper did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.38 
 In a case with a similar fact pattern to Knotts, in United States v. Karo, law enforcement 
obtained a court order to install a beeper in a shipment of ether to defendant.39 Law enforcement 
then tracked the shipment over the course of several days as it changed locations multiple times, 
and using this information they obtained a warrant to search the final resting place of the 
shipment.40 In Karo, the Court examined the surveillance of a private residence using the beeper, 
which was distinguishable from the monitoring of the shipment on public roads in Knotts.41 The 
Court differentiated the cases by noting that the surveillance in this case was able to “reveal a 
critical fact about the interior” of the home that could not have been determined unless they had 
obtained a warrant.42 Law enforcement, therefore, had violated a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.43 
 The Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States examined Katz’s application to thermal 
imaging devices. Law enforcement aimed the device at defendant’s home under the suspicion 
that he was growing marijuana, which requires high levels of heat to cultivate.44 The Court held 
that such surveillance constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.45 The Court focused on 
the fact that the technology had the capability to see into the home, potentially exposing sensitive 
                                                        
37 Id. 
38 See Id. at 282. 
39 See United States v, Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
40 See Id. at 708-09. 
41 See Id. at 714. 
42 Id. at 715. 
43 See Id. at 714-715. 
44 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001). 
45 See Id. at 40. 
 9 
information.46 The Court has also long acknowledged there is a “minimal expectation of privacy 
that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable” inside of the home.47 The Court also 
emphasized the fact that the technology utilized by law enforcement was “not in general public 
use.”48 
 In the most recent case, United States v. Jones, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court 
analyzed a new form of technology under a different theory than the Katz framework. In this 
case, law enforcement suspected the defendant of trafficking drugs and applied for a warrant to 
attach a GPS device to his car.49 While his car was parked in a parking lot, law enforcement 
attached this device, which tracked his movements over a period of 28 days.50 The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, bases the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment search 
occurred not on the Katz test but upon a theory of trespass.51 Under this theory, due to the fact 
that the government made a physical invasion onto defendant’s property, a search had 
occurred.52 Justice Scalia, while relying on a theory of trespass under these circumstances, would 
still apply the Katz framework in “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without [a physical] trespass . . . .”53  
 The concurring opinions by Justices Sotomayor and Alito in Jones, however, base their 
reasoning on the traditional Katz framework. When determining whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists, Justice Sotomayor takes into consideration the attributes of GPS 
                                                        
46 See Id. at 38 (Stating that the technology could reveal “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her 
daily sauna and bath.”) 
47 Id. at 34. 
48 See Id. 
49 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (At the time law enforcement placed the device on the car 
the warrant had expired and the car was not in the jurisdiction in which the warrant had been issued). 
50 See Id. 
51 See Id. at 951. 
52 See Id. 
53 Id. at 953. 
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technology that allow the development of a “precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
movements.”54 She further suggests that the court should reexamine the validity of the third party 
doctrine, which she describes as “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal 
of information to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”55 
 Justice Alito in his concurrence states that prior to technological advancements, “the 
greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”56 In order 
for law enforcement officers in the past to obtain information similar to that obtained using a 
GPS device, they would have to expend large number of resources – both in terms of financial 
and personnel resources – whose expenditure was not necessary with the advent of GPS 
technology.57 Justice Alito concludes his analysis by reasoning that “society's expectation has 
been that law enforcement agents and others would not--and indeed, in the main, simply could 
not secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very long 
period.”58 
 
Part III. Circuits That Do Not Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in CSLI 
 While the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the lingering question of whether 
CSLI is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, the Circuit Courts have begun 
lining up on either side of the question. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have determined that law 
enforcement does not need to obtain a warrant before compelling disclosure of CSLI.59 While the 
Third Circuit also addressed the question of whether a warrant is required, the appeal was from a 
                                                        
54 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 957. 
56 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
57 See Id. at 963-64. 
58 Id. at 964. 
59 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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magistrate judge’s denial of an application and thus the warrant requirement was analyzed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Therefore, the Third Circuit has seemingly left open the question 
of the Stored Communication Act’s constitutionality as applied to CSLI.60 While the Sixth 
Circuit does not analyze an application by the government under the Stored Communications 
Act, they do analyze whether Katz is implicated in law enforcement’s tracking of an individual 
through their cell phone (using a different type of CSLI) and determine that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.61 
 
A. The Fifth Circuit 
 In In re United States Application for Historical Cell Site Data, decided in 2012, the 
government filed three applications for compelled disclosure of CSLI for three different 
investigations, each for a period of sixty days.62 The Court determined that it is required to grant 
the order under the Stored Communications Act if the Government wishes “(1) to require a 
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service (2) to disclose a [non-
content] record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service 
when the Government (3) meets the specific and articulable facts standard.”63 Under the Fifth 
Circuit’s reading, if the government satisfies these requirements, the magistrate judge has no 
discretion to refuse to grant the order.64 
 Before analyzing CSLI under the Katz framework, the Court notes that while the content 
of communications sent by a third party are protected, the information “which the business needs 
                                                        
60 See In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Comm. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). 
61 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
62 See In re Application of the United States, 724 F.3d at 602. 
63 Id. at 607. 
64 See Id. 
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to route those communications appropriately and efficiently,” is not.65 Utilizing this standard, it 
reasons that CSLI is a business record.66 The Court focuses on the facts that the service provider 
is collecting and storing this information for its own purposes and that such information is 
necessary in order to connect calls.67 
 The Court also rejects the contention that the information was not voluntarily conveyed 
to the service providers. It notes that contained in the users’ agreements with the service 
providers is a clause that informed the consumer that this information was being retained and 
stored by the provider. Another clause warns consumers of the possibility that the government 
may require the service providers to disclose that information.68 The Fifth Circuit also posits that 
even if users were not aware of these clauses, their use of a cell phone was voluntary. The 
government neither requires individuals to use cell phones nor do they require individuals to 
obtain cell phone coverage from a provider that stores CSLI.69 
 Finally, the Court rejects the contention that society’s reasonable expectations of privacy 
have changed with regards to information conveyed to third parties.70 Rather, the Court states 
that the legislature is the proper place to effectuate society’s changing expectations.71 Finishing 
its analysis, the Court concludes that it “understand[s] that cell phone users may reasonably want 
their location information to remain private . . . but the recourse for these desires is in the market 
or the political process.”72 
 
                                                        
65 Id. at 611. 
66 See Id. at 612. 
67 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013). 
68 See Id. at 613. 
69 See Id. 
70 Id. at 614. 
71 See Id. 614-15. 
72 Id. In re Application of the United States, 724 F.3d at 615. 
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B. Eleventh Circuit 
 In United States v. Davis, which was issued on May 5, 2015, the defendant was indicted 
for committing seven robberies in a two-month period.73 Before trial, the government was able to 
obtain a court order to compel the disclosure of defendant’s CSLI under the SCA, which helped 
show the defendant’s movements over that period of time, leading to his conviction.74 On appeal, 
the Eleventh Circuit was asked whether CSLI requires Fourth Amendment protection. Like the 
Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit begins its analysis by looking at CSLI in the framework of a 
business record. They state that the defendant cannot claim ownership of the information since it 
is “lawfully created by a third-party . . . for legitimate business purposes.”75 
 In examining the reasonable expectations of cell phone users, the Eleventh Circuit agrees 
with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that cell phone users understand how cell phone technology 
works, and therefore, they can claim no subjective expectation of privacy in the information that 
allows their calls to be made.76 Even if a user can claim such a subjective expectation of privacy, 
the Court finds that, when that expectation is “viewed objectively, [it] is not justifiable or 
reasonable.”77 Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Court notes that if cell phone users wish to 
prevent the government from obtaining such information, the proper forum is the legislature and 
not the judiciary.78 
 While the Eleventh Circuit concludes that CSLI does not receive Fourth Amendment 
protection, it goes further to examine Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones. The Court rejects the 
argument that Fourth Amendment protection was required under Justice Alito’s concurrence, 
                                                        
73 See Davis, United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015). 
74 See Id. at 501. 
75 Id. at 511. 
76 See Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 512. 
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because, unlike GPS, CSLI is not precise enough to give rise to the concerns cited in Jones.79 
CSLI merely identifies the particular cell tower from which the call was connected and its use is 
limited by the strength and density of cell towers that vary depending on service providers.80 The 
Court views this technology as far different from the precision and constant flow of information 
that GPS technologies provide.81 
 Assuming arguendo that there was a subjective expectation of privacy, the Court finally 
examines whether an unreasonable search occurred. The Court relies on the facts that no 
conversations were heard or recorded, there was no real-time tracking of defendant, and that the 
SCA contains privacy protections in its provisions in determining that the search was a 
reasonable one.82 The Court places additional emphasis on the fact that such records serve a 
compelling governmental interest in facilitating the apprehension and conviction of criminals in 
reaching this determination.83 
 
C. Third Circuit 
 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit was faced with a situation in which a magistrate 
judge had denied an application for CSLI under the SCA.84 In In re United States Order 
Directing Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the 
Government, which was decided in 2010, the Court begins its analysis by reviewing the 
controlling Supreme Court precedent and noting that the holdings in Knotts and Karo establish 
                                                        
79 See Id. at 515. 
80 See Id. 
81 See Id. 
82 See Id. at 517. 
83 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015). 
84 See In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Comm. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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that “the privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home.”85 Since the Third 
Circuit could find no evidence in the record that CSLI can implicate an individual’s movements 
inside of his home, in their view, such information does not require a warrant.86 
 While it agrees with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that there is no need for a warrant, 
the Court differs in its analysis of the statutory language of the SCA. The Third Circuit came to a 
different conclusion than the Fifth Circuit on whether or not the statutory language gives the 
Court discretion when determining whether to issue such an order. The Court determined that if 
Congress wanted to require a mandatory disclosure of CSLI then they could have done so with 
the language “shall issue.”87 The Third Circuit reasons that the use of the language “‘may issue’ 
strongly implies court discretion, an implication bolstered by the subsequent use of the phrase 
‘only if’ in the same sentence.”88 
 The Third Circuit also departs from the analysis of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in 
concluding that CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed by users to service providers. In their view, 
“[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular 
provider in any meaningful way.”89 Cell phone users only voluntarily convey to the service 
provider the number they dial and, in situations where they are receiving a call, they do not 
voluntarily convey anything.90 While this language seems to suggest that the Third Circuit would 
consider a constitutional challenge to the statute, it ended its analysis with the familiar 
proposition that the legislature is the proper place for making such determinations.91 
 
                                                        
85 Id. at 312. 
86 See Id. at 312-313. 
87 See Id. at 315. 
88 Id. 
89 In re United States for an Order, 620 F.3d at 317. 
90 See Id. at 317-18. 
91 See Id. at 319. 
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D. Sixth Circuit 
 In United States v. Skinner, decided in 2012, the defendant had come under suspicion of 
trafficking marijuana.92 In order to track his movements, law enforcement would “ping” his 
phone allowing them to track his movements through CSLI.93 This technique is different from 
the one which was utilized by law enforcement in the cases that reached the Third, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuits. In those cases, law enforcement was seeking to obtain historical CSLI that 
would show the defendants’ movements over time.94 In this case, the technique utilized by law 
enforcement allowed them to track the defendant’s movements in real time by forcing his cell 
phone to record CSLI when it otherwise would not.95 While this case does not regard an 
application of the government under the SCA, the Sixth Circuit nonetheless examines CSLI 
under the Katz framework.  
 The Court reasons that CSLI is the same as the information obtained from the beeper in 
Knotts and subject to the holding in that case that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.96 The Court contends that “while the cell site information aided the police in 
determining Skinner's location, that same information could have been obtained through visual 
surveillance,” and as such there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.97 The Court also 
emphasizes that the interests law enforcement have in tracking criminals outweigh the interests 
of cell phone users in having CSLI subjected to a warrant requirement when reaching their 
decision.98 
                                                        
92 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012). 
93 Id. at 775-76. 
94 See In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Comm. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
602 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 502 (11th Cir. 2015). 
95 See Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776. 
96 See Id. at 778. 
97 Id. 
98 See Id. at 777. 
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Part IV. Circuits That Do Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in CSLI 
A. Fourth Circuit 
 While there are three circuits that decidedly state that CSLI does not receive the 
protections given by the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit is the only court to rule that it 
does receive such protections. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling is the most recent, being rendered on 
August 5, 2015 in United States v. Graham. There, the defendant had participated in a string of 
robberies and the government obtained 221 days of CSLI, aiding in the conviction of the 
defendant.99 The Court dismissed the defendant’s claim that the CSLI evidence should not have 
been admitted at trial due to a clause in the defendants’ contracts with their service providers 
noting the retention of CSLI and the possibility that the government might compel its disclosure. 
Nevertheless, the Court examined the constitutionality of obtaining CSLI without a warrant.100 
 The Court begins its analysis by noting that a search of historical CSLI is similar to the 
searches in Karo and Kyllo because the technology is precise enough to place a person inside of 
their home.101 Moreover, the Court further reasons that CSLI is more invasive than the searches 
performed in Karro and Kyllo due to its constant transmission of information on the personal 
location as well as the length of time which the technology is utilized for.102 In looking at the 
concurring opinions in Jones, the Court echoes the fears espoused in Justices Alito and 
Sotomayor’s opinions. The Court fears that the constant monitoring of a person’s location can be 
implicated through CSLI.103 They reason that the technology is also more invasive than the GPS 
                                                        
99 See United States v. Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *3-10 (4th Cir. 2015). 
100 See Id. at *21-22. 
101 See Id. at *24. 
102 See Id. at 25. 
103 See Id. at 28-29. 
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monitoring of an automobile since the cell phone is such an intimate item in modern society, 
capable of unveiling many aspects of a user’s private life.104 The Court concludes that “the 
government invades a reasonable expectation of privacy when it relies upon technology not in 
general use to discover the movements of an individual over an extended period of time.”105 
 When faced with the contention that CSLI should be analyzed under the third party 
doctrine, the Court notes that CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed and thus is not applicable to be 
analyzed under the third party doctrine.106 The Court reasons that because CSLI is generated 
without the user taking any affirmative process to create this information a user does not 
voluntarily convey CSLI.107 The Court places an emphasis on the fact that CSLI can be 
generated by a user receiving a call or text message that they do not answer or respond to, 
highlighting their argument that CSLI is not conveyed by users to cell service providers.108 They 
also refute the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, which holds that users do voluntarily convey CSLI by 
deciding to use their cell phones, by arguing that “[p]eople cannot be deemed to have 
volunteered to forfeit expectations of privacy by simply seeking active participation in society 
through use of their cell phones.”109 The Court concludes that an individual has a privacy interest 
in the aggregation of their movements over large periods of time and a service provider’s 
retention of CSLI does not diminish that privacy interest.110 
 The Fourth Circuit finally considers the implications of the digital age on Fourth 
Amendment precedent. The Court notes that CSLI is unlike routing information, which has not 
been afforded Fourth Amendment protection, due to the fact that it conveys a user’s location and 
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there has been no evidence that users intend this information to be examined by others.111 The 
Court posits that “even as technology evolves, protections against government intrusion should 
remain consistent with those privacy expectations society deems reasonable.”112 The Court notes 
that even though the advent of CSLI has left service providers with precise data on users’ 
location information, this does not diminish the traditional societal expectation that individuals’ 
movements would not be tracked and aggregated over lengthy periods of time.113 
 
Part V. The Supreme Court Should Affirm Cell Phone User’s Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in CSLI 
 While it may be the only circuit to hold that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in CSLI, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of CSLI under the Katz framework is the proper one. CSLI 
is not a business record under the third party doctrine because cell phone users do not voluntarily 
convey this information to service providers. Cell phone users have a subjective expectation of 
privacy in CSLI and that expectation is objectively reasonable in society’s eyes. CSLI is also 
precise enough to implicate the concerns expressed by Justices Alito and Sotomayor in their 
separate concurrences. 
 
A. CSLI is Not a Business Record and Therefore Not Subject to the Third Party Doctrine 
 The Circuits, as well as scholars, have mainly focused their analysis under the third party 
doctrine around three factors: a general knowledge of how cell phones work, clauses in users’ 
agreements alerting them to the retention of such information and the possibility that the 
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government may compel its disclosure, and the voluntary nature of both cell phone use and CSLI 
generation.114 These factors, however, do not prove that CSLI is a business record under the third 
party doctrine. A general knowledge of how cell phones work does not mean users have 
voluntarily conveyed their CSLI, and further users generally do not read their agreements in 
which clauses alerting them of this practice are contained. Cell phone use is also no longer 
voluntary for those who wish to fully participate in the modern economic and social society of 
America. Finally, the fact that CSLI is generated as an automatic byproduct of cell phone use 
further demonstrates that the third party business records doctrine is not applicable to CSLI. 
 As previously mentioned, some scholars rely on users’ general understanding of cell 
phone technology as their support for the contention that users therefore understand what CSLI is 
and how it is generated.115 “[W]hen a cell phone user makes or receives a call, and knows that 
his phone is communicating with the nearest cell tower, he is aware that he has conveyed his 
approximate location to the [cell service provider].”116 This line of reasoning is seriously flawed 
because it assumes that users understand this technology. The United States Attorneys and the 
law enforcement agents themselves in most cases do not understand the technology and have a 
difficult time explaining it to the presiding judges when applying for a court order.117 If 
sophisticated attorneys and law enforcement agents who work with this technology regularly 
cannot understand how it works, then it is hardly safe to assume that an average cell phone user 
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possesses such a level of understanding. Even if some users do possess such knowledge, this 
knowledge cannot be imputed to all cell phone users and to society as a whole. 
Even assuming that users understand how cell phone technology works, it is hard to 
imagine average users being aware of the massive retention of this data for such lengthy periods 
of time.118 Further, it is also unlikely that the average user understands how precise CSLI has 
grown as a result of the increase in competition amongst cell service providers to provide the 
best coverage. The improved precision of the location data as the distance between cell towers 
and their range shrink allows CSLI to track a person’s whereabouts with increased accuracy.119  
 The Fifth Circuit also notes that users had voluntarily conveyed that information to the 
providers because they had agreed to the clause in the users’ agreements that such information 
will be gathered and may be disclosed to the government. Thus, the clause demonstrates that 
they are records prepared in the ordinary course of business.120 These provisions, however, are 
not routinely read nor are they understood by the users who sign up for these services.121 “[C]ell 
phone users do not routinely scan the minutiae of their contract with the provider to find the 
buried provision relating to who owns the data or whether the service provider will release said 
data to law enforcement or any other third party.”122 Moreover, even if users are aware of the 
presence of these clauses, they have no meaningful option to negotiate for their removal or to 
choose a different provider, as these are standard clauses in nearly all service provider 
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contracts.123 It would be a mistake to entrust service providers with the task of safeguarding the 
privacy of their users’ CSLI as profit motives will often lead to discounting user privacy 
concerns.124 These clauses contained in users’ contracts cannot serve as the basis for finding that 
CSLI are business records that were voluntarily conveyed. 
 The Fifth Circuit further reasons that the use of a cell phone is a voluntary action that the 
government does not compel and therefore CSLI is a business record subject to the third party 
doctrine.125 The use of a cell phone is no longer as voluntary a choice as the Court likes to make 
it seem. As the statistics discussed earlier show, the use of cell phones is no longer confined to 
the more affluent segments of American society, but is utilized throughout all of American 
society.126 For increasing segments of the American population cell phone ownership has 
become “essential to full cultural and economic participation.”127 Cell phone use has become a 
critical tool in performing occupational responsibilities and almost a social necessity in order to 
stay connected with friends and family.128 This is especially true given the nature of the modern 
smartphone and all the functions it is capable of performing.129 The contention that cell phone 
use is voluntary in American society is one that is detached from the reality of modern economic 
and social activity.  
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Nearly every occupation now requires the ability to get in touch with colleagues and 
superiors at a moment’s notice. To choose not to carry a cell phone will eliminate these 
individuals from certain occupations. For most of the American population this is no choice at 
all. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland made a similar argument about landline 
phone use and the contention that users had assumed the risk of the numbers they dialed being 
conveyed to law enforcement. He noted that “[u]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of what 
for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of 
surveillance. It is idle to speak of assuming risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, 
individuals have no realistic alternative.”130 Cell phone users in modern society, as Justice 
Marshall observed of landline phone users, lack such a realistic alternative. As such, the third 
party doctrine has no relevance in analysis of CSLI. 
It is also important to note that CSLI is generated without any affirmative act of the user. 
A user also lacks the ability to block the transmission of such information as well.131 CSLI is 
generated not only when a user sends or receives a call or text message, but also when they 
receive a call or text message to which they do not answer.132 This is even more so for 
smartphones which generate CSLI every time they receive “a push notification or download 
something in the background.”133 Consequently, such information cannot be said to be 
voluntarily conveyed by the user to the service provider. Even if cell phone users do not have an 
expectation of privacy when dialing phone numbers, it is a stretch to say that users are actively 
inputting their location before making a call.134 Chamberlain sums up the issue when he states 
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“CSLI is an automatic byproduct of cell phone use of which the average user is unaware. 
Individuals using cell phones, in other words, do not make an informed choice to allow their 
providers to record information about their movements.”135 
CSLI is also a far more intimate record than the bank records at issue in Miller or than the 
phone records at issue in Smith that were both deemed voluntarily conveyed business records.136 
In Miller, the records that law enforcement was able to obtain were “checks, deposit slips, two 
financial statements, and three monthly statements.”137 While these records certainly exposed 
intimate details about the defendant’s life, they did not compile the in-depth picture of his daily 
activities that CSLI records can. Law enforcement may have learned that the defendant withdraw 
a sum of cash, but they would not have been able to see where he spent such cash and track his 
movements through these records. Similarly in Smith, all that law enforcement was able to obtain 
was a list of numbers the defendant had dialed.138 While this information too was sensitive in 
nature, it did not paint an intimate picture of the defendant’s life. All that was revealed by the 
pen register was the numbers he had dialed. It did not reveal the conversations he may have had 
in person or the places he may have visited without calling first. CSLI paints a far more intimate 
and detailed picture of an individual’s life than either bank or landline phone records can. CSLI, 
like bank and landline phone records, is a snapshot of an instant in time, however, CSLI is 
generated to a far more frequent degree and is not confined to generation in certain locations like 
bank and landline phone records are. Additionally, when individuals conduct transactions with 
banks and use landline phones, they take clear, affirmative steps that create these records. CSLI, 
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however, is generated often without any affirmative action taken on behalf of the user, another 
indication that the third party doctrine is not applicable. 
Since users do not have a detailed knowledge of how cell phone systems operate, they do 
not read or understand the clauses in service providers’ contracts explaining the retention and 
possibility of compelled disclosure, cell phone use is no longer voluntary in today’s society, and 
because CSLI is generated as an automatic byproduct, CSLI cannot be a business record under 
the third party doctrine. This finding then leads to analysis of cell phone users’ subjective and 
objective expectations of privacy in CSLI in order to determine whether it deserves Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
 
B. Cell Phone Users Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in CSLI 
 The Circuits and scholars who have argued that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI have relied on the fact that it is a business record created during the ordinary 
course of business. Therefore, cell phone users do not have a subjective expectation of privacy. 
As discussed previously, CSLI is not a business record and thus requires an analysis under Katz 
of whether users have a subjective expectation of privacy. 
 It is difficult to imagine a user relinquishing their privacy interest in something they do 
not understand or even know exists.139 Further, users do not have a choice in preventing CSLI 
from being generated, absent from abandoning the use of their cell phone. As such, users cannot 
be deemed to have given up their expectation of privacy. “People cannot be deemed to have 
volunteered to forfeit expectations of privacy by simply seeking active participation in society 
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through use of their cell phones.”140 It is hard to imagine that in “a nation founded on the 
principles of liberty and freedom [a] . . . pre-condition for participation in the social and business 
life of the nation is to give to the government the ability to track your location at all times.”141 As 
the Fourth Circuit aptly reasons “[i]n the absence of any evidence that . . . cell phone users 
generally intend for their location information to be open to inspection by others” there can be no 
other conclusion than that users retain a subjective expectation of privacy in their CSLI.142 
 Some scholars point to the fact that some applications on smartphones contain features 
that allow users to share their location as an indication that users have given up their subjective 
expectation of privacy in their location data.143 This confuses the issue, as the information shared 
in applications is not the same as CSLI. This type of location information is not information that 
is continuously generated throughout the day without the user’s affirmative actions. When users 
share their location to their friends and family on social media or other location based apps, it is 
for a single moment in time. This selective, single-instant sharing of location cannot be assumed 
to be a signal from users that they relinquish all privacy rights that they may have in any location 
information generated from the use of their cell phone. 
 Since CSLI is not a business record under the third party doctrine, the contention that 
users do not have a subjective expectation of privacy cannot be justified under this theory. Most 
users do not understand how the technology works and have no capability to stop the information 
from being generated. Thus, users have a subjective expectation of privacy in CSLI. 
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C. Users Have an Objective Expectation of Privacy 
 It is important to remember at the outset of the objective portion of the Katz analysis that 
“judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical 
reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”144 This reasonable person test is largely 
dependent upon a judge’s own personal construction when faced with an order to compel such 
disclosure or upon appellate review and can change in the face of advancing technology.145 Most 
judges do not have a “technological expertise,” which may also contribute to a judge’s 
substitution of society’s reasonable expectations with that of the experts in the field writing 
amicus briefs who may have their own agendas.146 In his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito 
correctly reasoned that “society's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others 
would not – and indeed, in the main, simply could not secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement of an individual.”147 While Justice Alito was speaking about GPS monitoring, 
the same could be said for the use of CSLI. 
 “Recent polling data tells us that 82% of adults feel as though the details of their physical 
location gathered over a period of time is very sensitive or somewhat sensitive.”148 This number 
accurately reflects the notion that a reasonable person expects their CSLI to remain private. 
Society has long recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone conversations. 
Simply because their phones now have the ability to monitor their location as well does not mean 
that users do not expect government to obtain a warrant before doing so.149 The advent of this 
new technology has made it capable to track people’s movements over lengthy periods of time. 
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Society does not expect that a person can be tracked in such a discrete manner and without the 
expenditure of large amounts of law enforcement resources. Simply because it is now possible to 
track a person using cell phone towers, that reasonable expectation should not change.150 
 As the Fourth Circuit holds, the Supreme Court precedent leads to the conclusion that 
“the government invades a reasonable expectation of privacy when it relies upon technology not 
in general use to discover the movements of an individual over an extended period of time.”151 It 
has been recognized that a person has a privacy interest in their movements over time and their 
movements in their home, CSLI technology has the capability to, and often does, invade those 
traditionally recognized areas of privacy.152 Merely because new technology has given law 
enforcement new methods in their pursuit of criminals does not mean traditionally held 
expectations of privacy are abrogated. The Katz doctrine has adapted to new technology in 
Knotts and Karro, Kyllo, and Jones and it needs to do so again in the face of compelled 
disclosure of CSLI.153 
 Some scholars have suggested that if Katz could be “taken to its logical conclusion” then 
the government could simply announce that they are using such technology to erase any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.154 This argument is incorrect, as nothing that the 
government “announces” can diminish society’s reasonable expectations of privacy that have 
long been recognized in traditional places such as the home. Widespread knowledge of an 
objectively viewed unlawful governmental activity can never diminish reasonable expectations 
of privacy. “[N]ot recognizing an expectation of privacy when one knows that their privacy can 
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be infringed upon will eventually result in no privacy expectations as technology becomes more 
invasive.”155 The reasonable expectation of privacy will only continue to grow, not diminish, as 
this technology becomes more and more precise and smartphone ownership grows.156 
 Cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI because it implicates 
areas that have traditionally been recognized as having privacy rights and users widely regard 
their location information as being sensitive. That new technology allows law enforcement to do 
things that were previously unimaginable does not mean we need to reimagine our expectations 
of privacy that have been traditionally held and respected by government. 
 
D. CSLI is Precise Enough to Implicate Jones’ Concurrence Concerns as Well as Traditional 
Privacy Rights in the Home 
 Justice Alito in his concurrence in Jones acknowledges that “the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”157 CSLI 
monitoring, while not as precise as GPS in every instance, has the capability of being just as 
invasive, if not more so, than GPS monitoring of a person’s movements. CSLI also has the 
ability to track users in locations that GPS devices previously could not.158 The proliferation of 
cell towers has made the “antennas, microcells, and femtocells” capable of “reveal[ing] . . . 
location information with differing levels of precision—to the nearest mile, or the nearest block, 
or the nearest foot.”159 The Supreme Court itself has recently recognized the ability of CSLI to 
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“reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also 
within a particular building.” 160 
Simply because there are sparsely populated areas with few cell phone towers where this 
technology is utilized, the opposite scenario of densely populated areas with a multitude of cell 
phone towers cannot be immediately discounted. It is undeniable that a vast percentage of cell 
phone users live in densely populated areas where cell towers are most needed to provide users 
with a service capable of handling the massive amount of daily activity. While some circuits and 
scholars may tend to discount this fact, the reality is for many Americans living in urban 
environments the tracking of CSLI has become precise enough to be relied on in the same 
manner that GPS technology is.161 
 As the Fourth Circuit has argued, CSLI may provide a more intimate picture of a user’s 
life than GPS monitoring of a car, in that while a person is not moving at all times in his car, he 
or she is rarely without his or her cell phone.162 This would allow the government to track an 
individual in their movements “between public and private spaces, impacting at once her 
interests in both the privacy of her movements and the privacy of her home.”163 This type of 
tracking surely implicates greater privacy interests than the GPS monitoring of a person’s car 
does, especially when viewed over a longer period of time. As cell phone technology improves 
and the amount and density of cell towers continue to grow, CSLI will only grow more precise, 
not less, further indicating that it is, or if it is not now it shortly will be, analogous to GPS 
technology.164 Even if it is accepted that CSLI is not currently as precise as GPS technology, it 
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still reveals location information with an “unnerving level of specificity” implicating Jones 
concerns.165 
 The purpose for which law enforcement uses this information is another indication that 
CSLI implicates Jones concerns. “The general character of cell site location information and the 
purposes for which the government seeks it make it largely analogous to GPS location 
information.”166 The government is not seeking this information for purposes other than to 
identify where the defendant was at a precise moment in time. Rather, the government is 
aggregating this information to make it more likely that the defendant is guilty of what the 
government is accusing him or her of. While law enforcement should not be prohibited from 
utilizing new technology, they should simply be required to show probable cause before being 
allowed to access information that reveals such intimate details of an individual’s life. Even 
though it currently may not be as precise as GPS monitoring, “it is far more ubiquitous, because 
every cell phone is capable of being located by CSLI technology.”167 Law enforcement will not 
have to go through the trouble of placing a GPS device on a person or their car; instead, they will 
merely utilize what in effect is a GPS device that users have voluntarily placed on themselves.168 
This will make it far easier for law enforcement to utilize and, in turn, to abuse this technology. 
 CSLI is also precise enough to implicate the long recognized privacy right of the home. 
The Court in Kyllo stated a search has occurred if information is obtained regarding the interior 
of the home through technology not in general use.169 In that case thermal vision, which was not 
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in general public use, was utilized to discern details about the interior of the home.170 The 
modern counterpart of this technology has now become CSLI. Like thermal vision, while it may 
not operate like x-ray vision allowing law enforcement to literally see through the wall of a 
home, CSLI still allows law enforcement to uncover details about the interior of the home that 
they could not have uncovered through mere visual surveillance. Moreover, it is clear that the 
computer programs being utilized by the government to analyze and plot CSLI are not currently 
in general use. Even if analogized as GPS information, it can hardly be said that users of that 
technology have ready access to obtain GPS information about other users.171 “There is no 
widely available program . . . for utilizing GPS data,” it requires highly technical skills and 
programs not possessed by the public.172 The general public’s utilization of GPS technology is to 
find out information about their own location, not location information about other users. To 
claim that even GPS technology, as utilized by the government in Jones, is technology available 
to the public would strain credulity. 
 In Graham, the government collected an average of 100 data points per day on each 
defendant, leading to the Fourth Circuit to argue that surely some of these data points indicated 
that the defendants were at their home.173 As was stated in Kyllo, “[t]he Fourth Amendment's 
protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of 
information obtained . . . In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the 
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”174 It is not determinative to say that CSLI 
cannot track a user’s movements from one room of their house to another. If a person’s presence 
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in his home could not be observed through visual surveillance, the use of CSLI to find out this 
information clearly violates a traditional expectation of privacy. This is especially true because 
law enforcement cannot know which location points will be uncovered when the CSLI is 
disclosed, making the search presumptively unconstitutional.175 That is why it is no solution to 
require as a “threshold determination,” as some have suggested, to have the magistrate assess 
whether the CSLI will implicate a user’s presence in their home before they may grant such an 
order.176 It will be impossible for magistrate judges to make such a determination before the 
disclosure occurs without guessing about a user’s daily habits or after being presented with 
information by law enforcement officials regarding visual observations of a user’s movements, 
effectively rendering CSLI duplicative. 
CSLI is also implicated by Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones by the fact that it has the 
capability of revealing a person’s movements while in private spaces. With the prevalence of cell 
phone use it is likely that one of the many location points uncovered will locate a person inside 
of their home. In rare cases involving large residences, it may even be possible to achieve this 
precision in tracking an individual from room to room. “Although examples involving sprawling 
but private locations of this sort admittedly are exceptional cases, even exceptional cases 
undermine the opponents' position that CSLI never can reveal more than that which can be 
observed by visual surveillance.”177 The ability of CSLI to locate a cell phone user inside their 
residence is also reason to reject the argument that a durational requirement on court orders 
                                                        
175 See Jones, supra note 155, at 235-236; Chamberlain, supra note 128, at 1787 (“[T]he practical reality is that 
[service providers] are unable to filter their CSLI according to the type of location it reveals.”). 
176 Steven M. Hawkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause is Necessary to Protect What’s Left of the 
Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1918 (2011) (“In order to answer this question in the negative, a 
reviewing magistrate judge would have to decide that automatic cell phone registration, which takes place 
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which disclosure is requested.”). 
177 Chamberlain, supra note 128, at 1788. 
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compelling CSLI can cure Fourth Amendment concerns.178 A user’s presence in his residence 
could be observed in a single day’s CSLI, violating the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court in Karo similarly recognized that although law enforcement had followed the 
signal from the beeper to the residence lawfully, once they were able to discern that it was inside 
the house, something they would not have been able to observe visually, a search had 
occurred.179 Similarly with CSLI, law enforcement could observe a person enter their home, but 
then fail to observe the same individual leave through another entrance not known to them. If 
CSLI continues to show the individual in their home for elongated periods of time, law 
enforcement is able to learn something that they would not normally be able to without a 
warrant.180 The Court in Karo could not accept the argument that law enforcement should be free 
of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment when “determin[ing] by means of an electronic 
device, without a warrant . . . whether a particular article – or a person, for that matter – is in an 
individual's home at a particular time.”181 This same reasoning is applicable to CSLI, which is 
precise enough to determine whether a person is in their house at a particular time. 
 CSLI technology implicates the concerns raised in Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones 
because it is precise enough and used for the same purposes in order to analogize it to the use of 
GPS technology. Similarly to GPS technology, it can also reveal a person’s movements in 
private spaces, which has been constitutionally recognized as a private place. 
 
Part VI Conclusion 
                                                        
178 See Jones, supra note 155, at 242. 
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 It is no longer science fiction to think that the government has the capability of tracking a 
person’s every movement without a warrant; they possess this capability through examination of 
a cell phone user’s CSLI. It is evident that with the differing circuit opinions, both law 
enforcement and judges tasked with hearing these requests lack clarity on what the current state 
of the law is.182 This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the portable nature of cell phones and their 
ability to cross not only state boundaries, but circuit court boundaries as well.183 The Supreme 
Court would be well advised to weigh in on this growing field of controversy amongst the circuit 
courts. 
When the Supreme Court does hear a question on CSLI, it will be clear that the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis of CSLI under the Katz test is the correct one. This comment has examined the 
Supreme Court precedent under Katz as well as analyzed each Circuit Court’s opinion that has 
addressed this issue. CSLI cannot be a business record due to the fact that a user does not 
voluntarily convey this information to a cell service provider. Thus, the third party doctrine is 
inapplicable to CSLI. Looking at expectations of privacy, cell phone users have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in CSLI because most do not understand the technology and when asked 
about the privacy of their location information cell phone users overwhelmingly respond that 
they consider such information to be private. Cell phone users’ expectation of privacy is also 
objectively reasonable in society’s eyes because the aggregation of a person’s movements as 
well as the invasion of a private space have all been traditionally afforded privacy protections 
and CSLI is capable of implicating both of these privacy concerns.  
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Although opponents of a probable cause standard for CSLI might harp on the difficulty 
this would create for law enforcement to carry out their responsibilities, all this comment 
proposes is merely that law enforcement seek a warrant before examining such information. This 
would not cripple law enforcement’s efforts to catch criminals; it would only safeguard society’s 
privacy. This is an entirely reasonable requirement in light of the pervasiveness of the cell phone 
in today’s modern society. As Justice Marshall stated “[p]rivacy . . . . is of value not only to 
those engaged in criminal activity. The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will 
undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide.”184 
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